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August 2006 (Rev. March 2007) 1 Introduction
Population ageing is playing havoc with the public pension schemes of many western coun-
tries. In a celebrated sequence of international comparative studies, Gruber and Wise (1999,
2004, 2005) and their collaborators have established a number of stylized facts pertaining to
a subset of OECD countries. These facts are:
(SF1) Formostdevelopedcountries, thepay-as-you-gosocialsecuritysystemincludespromises
that cannot be kept without signiﬁcant system reforms. In the absence of reform, cur-
rent systems are ﬁscally unsustainable.
(SF2) From the 1960s until the mid 1990s, the trend was for older people to leave the labour
force at ever younger ages. Retirement is a normal good in the sense that the demand
for years of retirement rises as agents’ income rises (Barr and Diamond, 2006, p. 27)
(SF3) Only a very small fraction of the labour force retires before the earliest age at which
publicretirementbeneﬁtsareavailable, theso-calledearlyeligibilityage(EEAhereafter).
The EEA typically is in the range of 60-62 years of age. Similarly, only very few people
work until the normal retirement age (NRA hereafter), which is typically 65 for most
countries (Duval, 2003, p. 35). Together this implies that most people retire either at
the EEA or somewhere in between the EEA and the NRA.
(SF4) Most social security programs contain strong incentives for older workers to leave the
labour force. In most countries it simply does not pay to work beyond the EEA because
adjustments are less than actuarially fair. The present value of expected social security
beneﬁts declines with the retirement age, so there is a high implicit tax on working
beyond the EEA.
(SF5) In many European countries disability programs and age-related unemployment pro-
visions essentially provide early retirement beneﬁts, even before the EEA.
In our view, a formal analysis of issues surrounding ageing, retirement, and pensions
can only be successful if it is able to accommodate at least some, but preferably all, of these
stylized facts. In this paper we study the consumption, saving, and retirement decisions
of individual agents facing lifetime uncertainty, or longevity risk. In addition, we also de-
termine the macroeconomic consequences of individual behaviour and policy changes. We
construct a simple analytical overlapping generations model and assume that the country in
question is small in world capital markets and thus faces an exogenous world interest rate,
which we take to be constant.
Our analysis makes use of modelling insights from two important branches of the lit-
erature. First, in order to allow for overlapping generations, we employ the generalized
Blanchard-Yaari model developed in our earlier papers (Heijdra and Romp, 2005, 2006). In
2this model disconnected generations are born at each instant and individual agents face an
age-dependent probability of death at each moment in time. By allowing the mortality rate
to depend on age, the model can be used to investigate the micro- and macroeconomic ef-
fects of a reduction in adult mortality, another well know phenomenon occurring in many
western countries over the last century or so. Finitely-lived agents fully insure against the
adverse affects of lifetime uncertainty by purchasing actuarially fair annuities.
The second building block of our analysis concerns the labour market participation de-
cision of individual agents. Following the seminal contribution by Sheshinski (1978) and
much of the subsequent literature, we assume that labour is indivisible (the agent either
works full time or not at all), that the retirement decision is irreversible, and that the felic-
ity function is additively separable in consumption and leisure. All agents are blessed with
perfect foresight and maximize an intertemporal utility function subject to a lifetime bud-
get constraint. Workers choose the optimal retirement age, taking as given the time- and age
proﬁlesofwages, theﬁscalparameters, and thepublicpension system. Notsurprisingly, like
Mitchell and Fields and many others we ﬁnd that “the optimal retirement age ... equates
the marginal utility of income from an additional year of work with the marginal utility of
one more year of leisure” (1984, p. 87).
The two papers most closely related to ours are Sheshinski (1978) and Boucekkine et
al. (2002).1 We extend the analysis of Sheshinski (1978) in two directions. First, as was
already mentioned above, we incorporate a realistically modelled lifetime uncertainty pro-
cess, rather than a ﬁxed planning horizon. Second, we embed the model in the context of
a small open economy and are thus able to study the macroeconomic repercussions of age-
ing and pension reform. We generalize the analysis of Boucekkine et al. (2002) by including
a concave, rather than linear, felicity function, and by modelling a public pension system
with realistic features such as an EEA which differs from the NRA and non-zero implicit tax
rates. Furthermore, we conduct our analysis with a general description of the demographic
process, whereas they use a speciﬁc functional form for this process throughout their paper.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present the model
and demonstrate its main properties. Consumption is proportional to total wealth, consist-
ing of ﬁnancial and human wealth. With a realistic demography, the marginal propensity to
consume out of wealth is increasing in the agent’s age because the planning horizon short-
ens as one grows older and the agent does not wish to leave any bequests. We derive the
ﬁrst-order condition for the optimal retirement age and show that it depends not only on the
mortality process but also on the features of the ﬁscal and pension systems. The mortality
process, in combination with the birth rate, also determines a unique path for the population
growth rate.
1In the interest of brevity, we refer the interested reader to the literature surveys on retirement and ageing by
Lazear (1986), Hurd (1990, 1997), and Weil (1997). For a recent literature survey on pension reform, see Lindbeck
and Persson (2003).
3In Section 3 we abstract from the public pension system and study the comparative static
effects on the optimal retirement age of various age-related shocks. A reduction in the disu-
tility of working leads to an increase in the optimal retirement age. In contrast, an upward
shift in the age proﬁle of wages causes a negative wealth effect but a positive substitution
effect, rendering the total effect on the optimal retirement age ambiguous. A reduction in
adult mortality increases the expected remaining lifetime for everyone, though more so for
older agents. The effect of increased longevity on the optimal retirement age is ambiguous
in general because the lifetime-income effect cannot be signed a priori. For realistic scenar-
ios, however, the increased longevity only starts to matter quantitatively at ages exceeding
the NRA so that the lifetime-income effect works in the direction of increasing the optimal
retirement age.
Section 3 also presents the graphical apparatus that we use throughout the paper. We
demonstrate that the optimal retirement decision is best studied in terms of its consequences
for lifetime income and the transformed retirement age. This transformed age is a monoton-
ically increasing transformation of the calender age and captures the notion of an agent’s
economic (rather than biological) age. Our graphical apparatus has the attractive feature
that indifference curves are convex and that the budget constraint is concave. We believe
that our graphical representation is more intuitive than the conventional one based on bio-
logical years.
In Section 4 we re-introduce the public pension system and determine its likely conse-
quences for the retirement decision of individual agents. Using data from Gruber and Wise
(1999) for nine OECD countries, we compute conservative estimates for standardized life-
time income proﬁles and ﬁnd that these proﬁles are concave in the transformed age domain.
For at least six of these countries, the lifetime income proﬁle features a kink at the EEA as a
result of non trivial implicit tax rates. Combined with convex indifference curves, it is not
surprising that many agents choose to retire at the EEA, conform stylized facts (SF3) and
(SF4).
In Section 5 we take the concavity of lifetime income proﬁles for granted and discuss
the comparative static effects on the optimal steady-state retirement age of various changes
in taxes or the public pension system. We restrict attention to interior solutions because an
optimum occurring at the kink in the lifetime income proﬁle is insensitive to small changes.
An increase in the poll tax leads to a reduction in lifetime income and an increase in the op-
timal retirement age. Retirement is thus a normal good in our model, conform stylized fact
(SF2). Not surprisingly, an increase in the labour income tax has an ambiguous effect on the
retirement age because the substitution effect is negative and the wealth effect is positive.
Holding constant the slope of the pension beneﬁt curve, an increase in its level unambigu-
ously leads to a decrease in the retirement age—the wealth effect and the substitution effect
operate in the same direction. In contrast, an increase in the slope of the beneﬁt curve, hold-
ing constant its level, leads to an increase in the optimal retirement age as a result of the
4positive substitution effect.
In Section 6 we compute and visualize the general equilibrium effects of various large
demographic shocks and several assumed policy reform measures. Conform stylized fact
(SF3), we postulate that in the initial steady state individuals are stuck at the early retire-
ment kink. Because both the shocks and the policy reform measures are inframarginal, we
simulate a plausibly calibrated version of our model to compute the impact-, transitional-,
and long-run effects on the macro-economy.
Finally, in Section 7 we present some concluding thoughts and give some suggestions for
future research. The paper also contains a number of brief Appendices dealing with issues
of a more technical nature.
2 The model
2.1 Households
From the perspective of time t, the (remaining) lifetime utility function for an agent born at




[U(¯ c(v,τ)) − I(τ − v,R(v)) D(τ − v)]e−[θ(τ−t)+M(τ−v)]dτ, (1)
where u ≡ t − v is the agent’s age in the planning period and I(τ − v,R(v)) is an indicator
function capturing the agent’s labour market status:
I(τ − v,R(v)) =
(
1 for 0 < τ − v < R(v) (working)
0 for τ − v ≥ R(v) (retired)
(2)
In equation (1), U (·) is a concave consumption-felicity function (to be discussed below),
¯ c(v,τ) is goods consumption, D(·) is the age-dependent disutility of working, R(v) is
the retirement age (see below), θ is the constant pure rate of time preference (θ > 0), and
e−M(τ−v) is the probability that the agent is still alive at time τ. The cumulative mortality rate
is deﬁned as M(τ − v) ≡
R τ−v
0 m(s)ds, where m(s) is the instantaneous mortality rate of a
household of age s. Several features of the lifetime utility function are worth noting. First, as
was pointed out by Yaari (1965), future felicity is discounted not only because of pure time
preference (as θ > 0) but also because of life-time uncertainty (as M(τ − v) > 0). Second,
following the standard convention in the literature, the instantaneous utility function is as-
sumed to be additively separable in goods consumption and labour supply.2 Previous to
retirement the agent works full time, and inelastically supplies its unitary time endowment
to the labour market. After retirement the agent does not work at all. Hence, we model the
labour market participation decision (rather than an hours-of-work decision). Leaving the
2See, for example, Sheshinski (1978), Burbidge and Robb (1980), Mitchell and Fields (1984), Kingston (2000),
Boucekkine et al. (2002), Kalemli-Ozcan and Weil (2002), and d’Albis and Augeraud-V´ eron (2005).
5labour force is assumed to constitute an irreversible decision.3 As a result, the age at which
the agent chooses to withdraw from the labour market, which we denote by R(v), can be
interpreted as the voluntary retirement age. Third, we assume that the disutility of working is
non-decreasing in age, i.e. D0 (τ − v) > 0. This captures the notion that working becomes
more burdensome as one grows older (cf. Boucekkine et al., 2002, p. 346).
The budget identity is given by:
˙ ¯ a(v,τ) = [r + m(τ − v)] ¯ a(v,τ) + I(τ − v,R(v)) ¯ w(τ − v)[1− tL (τ)]
+[1− I(τ − v,R(v))] ¯ p(v,τ,R(v)) − ¯ c(v,τ) − ¯ z(τ), (3)
where ¯ a(v,τ) is real ﬁnancial wealth, r is the exogenously given (constant) world rate of
interest, ¯ w(τ − v) is the age-dependent before-tax wage rate, tL is the labour income tax,
¯ p(·) is the public pension beneﬁt, and ¯ z is the poll tax (see below). As usual, a dot above a
variable denotes that variable’s time rate of change, e.g. ˙ ¯ a(v,τ) ≡ d¯ a(v,τ)/dτ. Following
Yaari (1965) and Blanchard (1985), we postulate the existence of a perfectly competitive life
insurance sector which offers actuarially fair annuity contracts. As a result, the annuity rate
of interest facing an agent of age τ − v is given by r + m(τ − v).
The public pension system is modelled as follows. The government cannot force people
to work, i.e. the voluntary retirement age, R(v), is chosen freely by each individual agent.
However, there exists an early eligibility age (EEA hereafter), which we denote by RE. The
EEA represents the earliest age at which social retirement beneﬁts can be claimed. An agent
who chooses to retire before reaching the EEA (R(v) < RE) will only get a public pension
beneﬁt from age RE onward, i.e. this agent will derive income only from ﬁnancial assets dur-
ing the age interval [R(v),RE]. The pension beneﬁts someone ultimately receives depends





0 if τ − v < RE
B(R(v)) if τ − v ≥ RE
(4)
where B(R(v)) is non-decreasing in the retirement age, i.e. B0 (R(v)) ≥ 0. Note that
B(R(v)) might be discontinuous at some retirement ages, but if it exists such a jump is
positive by assumption.
3Apart from lifetimeuncertaintythere areno other stochastic shocks in our model and agents are blessed with
perfect foresight. The empirical literature models retirement under uncertainty using the option-value approach.
See, for example, Stock and Wise (1990a, 1990b), Lumsdaine, Stock, and Wise (1992), and the recent survey by
Lumsdaine and Mitchell (1999).
4We thus assume a pure deﬁned beneﬁt system, i.e. previous payments into the pension system do not inﬂuence
thebeneﬁt. Sheshinski(1978, p. 353)assumesthatpensionbeneﬁtsalsodependoncharacteristicsoftheworker’s
wage proﬁle before retirement, e.g. the arithmetic average wage, ¯ wR ≡ (1/R)
R R
0 ¯ w(s)ds, or the maximum
earned wage, ¯ wR ≡ max{ ¯ w(s)} for 0 ≤ s ≤ R. We have abstracted from this dependency to keep the analysis a
simple as possible.
6Lifetime income (or human wealth) is deﬁned as the present value of after-tax non-asset
income using the annuity rate of interest for discounting. For a working individual, whose
age in the planning period falls short of the desired retirement age (t − v < R(v)), lifetime







¯ z(v + s)e−[rs+M(s)]ds
¸
+SSW(v,t,R(v)), (5)










tL(v + s) ¯ w(s)e−[rs+M(s)]ds
¸
. (6)
Intuitively, social security wealth represents the present value of retirement beneﬁts minus
contributions, again using the annuity rate of interest for discounting. By integrating the
budget identity (3) for τ ∈ [t,∞) and imposing the No-Ponzi-Game (NPG) condition,5 we




¯ c(v,t)e−[r(τ−v)+M(τ−v)]dτ = ¯ a(v,t) + li(v,t,R(v)). (7)
Thepresentvalueofcurrentandfutureconsumptionisequatedtototalwealth, whichequals
the sum of ﬁnancial wealth and human wealth.
The agent of vintage v chooses a time path for consumption ¯ c(v,τ) (for τ ∈ [t,∞)) and
a retirement age R(v) in order to maximize lifetime utility (1) subject to the lifetime budget
constraint (7). Due to the separability of preferences, the optimization problem can be solved
in two steps.
Consumption In the ﬁrst step, we solve for optimal consumption conditional on total








for σ 6= 1
ln ¯ c(v,τ) for σ = 1
(8)
where σ is the intertemporal substitution elasticity (σ > 0). The level and time proﬁle for
consumption are given by:
¯ c(v,t) =
¯ a(v,t) + li(v,t,R(v))
∆(u,r∗)
, (9)
¯ c(v,τ) = ¯ c(v,t)eσ(r−θ)(τ−t), for τ ≥ t, (10)
5The NPG condition is limτ→∞ ¯ a(v,τ)e−r(τ−t)−M(τ−v)+M(t−v) = 0.




e−[λs+M(s)]ds, for u ≥ 0, (11)
where u ≡ t − v and s ≡ τ − v denote, respectively, the agent’s age in the planning period
t and at some later time τ, and λ is a parameter of the function. In our earlier paper we
established a number of properties of the ∆(u,λ) function, which we restate for convenience
in Proposition 1.
Proposition 1 Let the demographic discount function, ∆(u,λ), be deﬁned as in (11) and
assume that the mortality rate is non-decreasing, i.e. m0 (s) ≥ 0 for all s ≥ 0. Then the
following properties can be established for ∆(u,λ):












(v) for m0 (s) > 0 and m00 (s) ≥ 0, the inequality in (ii) is strict and lim
u→∞
∆(u,λ) = 0.
Proof: see Heijdra and Romp (2005). ¤
Equation (9) shows that consumption in the planning period is proportional to total
wealth, with 1/∆(u,r∗) representing the marginal propensity to consume. It follows from
Proposition 1(v) that the consumption propensity is an increasing function of the individ-
ual’s age in the planning period. Old agents face a relatively short expected remaining life-
time, due to increasing mortality rates, and thus consume a larger fraction of their wealth in
each period. Equation (10) states the time path for consumption. In order to avoid having to
deal with a taxonomy of cases, we assume throughout the paper that r > θ, i.e. we study a
small nation populated by patient agents. It follows from (10) that the desired consumption
proﬁle is exponentially increasing over time.
Retirement In the second step of the maximization problem the optimal retirement age is
chosen. This in turn determines optimal lifetime income. The retirement decision is only
6The derivation of equations (9)–(11) is explained in detail in Heijdra and Romp (2005).
8relevant for a working individual, because labour market exit is an absorbing state. By sub-
stituting (9)–(10) into (1) we obtain the expression for lifetime utility of a working individual:
















, for u < R(v). (12)
Borrowingterminologyfromeconometrics, wereferto ¯ Λ(v,t) astheconcentratedutilityfunc-
tion, i.e. it is a transformation of the original lifetime utility function with the maximized
solution for the consumption path incorporated in it. As a result, the concentrated utility
function only depends on total wealth (including lifetime income) and on the retirement
age. Every working individual maximizes (12) by choosing li(v,t,R(v)) and R(v) subject
to the deﬁnition of lifetime income (5), taking as given the stock of ﬁnancial assets in the
planning period.7 This is a simple two-dimensional optimization problem with a single con-
straint. The optimal retirement age, R∗ (v), is the implicit solution to the followingﬁrst-order
condition:8




where we have used t ≡ v + u, and note that ¯ c(v,v + u) = ¯ c(v,t) is given in (9) above. The
optimal retirement age is chosen such that the marginal disutility of postponing retirement
(left-hand side) is equal to the marginal utility of the additional income that results from
the decision to continue working (right-hand side). The comparative static effects of the
optimal retirement age with respect to ageing and pension shocks are studied in detail in
Sections3and5below. Oneimportantpropertyofthesolutionisimmediatelyapparentfrom
(13): no rational agent will choose a retirement age at which lifetime income is downward
sloping. Because the marginal utility of consumption and the disutility of working are both
strictly positive, the optimal solution must be situated on the upward sloping part of the
li(v,t,R(v)) function. A direct corollary to this argument is as follows. If there exists a
lifetime-income maximizing retirement age, say RI, then this age is an upper bound for the
utility-maximizing retirement age, i.e. it is never optimal to retire after age RI.9
7After retirement, R(v) is ﬁxed and lifetime income is no longer a choice variable. Each individual simply
chooses consumption such that the lifetime budget constraint is just satisﬁed.
8Similar expressions can be found in Sheshinski (1978, p. 354) and Burbidge and Robb (1980, p. 424). Our
expression differs from theirs because we allow for lifetime uncertainty, whereas they assume that agents have
ﬁxed lifetimes.
9See also Footnote 16 below. As is pointed out by Kingston (2000, p. 834f5), Lazear (1979) assumes that the
disutility of labour is zero, so that retirement occurs at the point where lifetime income is maximized. Since this
typically occurs late in life, Lazear uses this result to rationalize the existence of mandatory retirement.
92.2 Demography
Weallowfornon-zeropopulationgrowthbyemployingtheanalyticalframeworkdeveloped
by Buiter (1988). This framework was subsequently generalized by Heijdra and Romp (2005,
2006) to account for an age-dependent mortality rate and to allow for a non-stationary de-
mography. In order to study ageing shocks below, we assume that different cohorts may
face different mortality proﬁles. In particular, we postulate that the instantaneous mor-
tality rate can be written as m(s,ψm (v)), where ψm (v) is a parameter that only depends
on the cohort’s time of birth. The corresponding cumulative mortality rate is written as
M(u,ψm (v)) ≡
R u
0 m(s,ψm (v))ds. Where no confusion arises, we drop the dependency of
ψm on v, and the dependency of m and M on ψm.
The birth rate is exogenous but may vary over time. The size of a newborn generation at
time v is proportional to the current population at that time, i.e. L(v,v) = b(v) L(v), where
b(v) and L(v) are, respectively the crude birth rate (b(v) > 0) and the population size at
time v. The size of cohort v at some later time τ is given by:
L(v,τ) = L(v,v)e−M(τ−v,ψm(v)) = b(v) L(v)e−M(τ−v,ψm(v)). (14)




L(v,t)dv ≡ L(v)eN(v,t), (15)
where n(τ) is the instantaneous growth rate of the population at time τ, and N (v,t) ≡
R t










Equation (16) shows the population share of the v-cohort at some later time t. Equation (17)
implicitly determines n(t) for given demographic parameters (see also Section 6).10
2.3 Firms
Perfectly competitive ﬁrms rent physical capital and efﬁciency units of labour from house-
holds in order to produce a homogeneous commodity, Y (t), that is traded internationally.
The technology is represented by the following Cobb-Douglas production function:
Y (t) = K(t)
ε [AYH (t)]
1−ε , 0 < ε < 1, (18)
10For an economy which has faced the same demographic environment for a long time (i.e., b(v) = b0 and





), the population growth rate is constant (n(τ) = n0) and equation (17) reduces
to 1/b0 = ∆(0,n0). This is the expression reported in Heijdra and Romp (2005).
10where AY is a constant index of labour-augmenting technological change, K(t) is the ag-
gregate stock of physical capital, and H (t) is employment in efﬁciency units. Following
Blanchard (1985, p. 235) and Gomme et al. (2005, p. 431) we assume that labour productiv-
ity is age dependent, i.e. a surviving worker of age τ − v is assumed to supply one unit of
“raw” labour and E(τ − v) efﬁciency units of labour. The efﬁciency proﬁle is exogenous.11




L(v,t) E(t − v)I(t − v,R(v))dv. (19)
Proﬁt maximizing behaviour yields the standard expressions for the factor demand equa-
tions:


















where δ is the depreciation rate on capital (δ > 0), w(t) is the rental price on efﬁciency
units of labour, h(t) ≡ H (t)/L(t), and k(t) ≡ K(t)/L(t). For each factor of production,
the marginal product is equated to the rental rate. Since the ﬁxed world interest rate pins
down the ratio between h(t) and k(t), it follows from (21) that the rental rate on efﬁciency
units of labour is time-invariant, i.e. w(t) = w. Hence, both physical capital and output are













where y(t) ≡ Y (t)/L(t). Finally, since efﬁciency units of labour are perfectly substitutable
in production, cost minimization of the ﬁrm implies that the wage rate for a worker of age u
is equal to:
¯ w(u) = wE(u). (24)
Despite the fact that w is constant, the wage facing individual workers is age-dependent
because individual labour productivity is.
11The comparative static effects of changes in the E(τ − v) function on the retirement decision are studied in
Section 3 below. Note that there exists a large literature on life-cycle labour supply and human capital accumu-
lation. See, for example, Ben-Porath (1967), Razin (1972), Weiss (1972), Heckman (1976), Drifﬁll (1980), Gustman
and Steinmeier (1986), Heckman et al. (1998), and Mulligan (1999). Boucekkine et al. (2002) and Heijdra and
Romp (2006), inter alia, model an optimally chosen education period at the beginning of the agent’s life.
113 Retirement and Ageing in the Absence of Pensions
In this section we study the comparative static effect on the optimal retirement age of various
ageing shocks. In order to build intuition, we abstract from a public pension system and
restrict attention to a comparison of steady states. A supplementary aim of this section is
to introduce the graphical apparatus with which the effects of pensions and ageing can be
visualized in an economically intuitive manner.
3.1 The retirement decision
In the steady state, we have tL (s) = tL, ¯ z(s) = ¯ z, ¯ a(v,t) = ¯ a(u), R(v) = R, li(v,t,R(v)) =
li(u,R). As a result, both the concentrated lifetime utility function and the expression for
lifetime income can be written solely in terms of the individual’s actual age, u, and the
planned retirement age, R:



















¯ w(s)e−[rs+M(s)]ds − ¯ z∆(u,r), (26)
where ¯ z∆(u,r) represents the present value of poll tax payments for an agent of age u.
In principle, it is possible to analyze the steady-state optimization problem directly in
(li,R)-space, but the solution is difﬁcult to visualize because both indifference curves and
the budget constraint are ill-behaving, i.e. indifference curves are S-shaped or concave (see
Appendix A). This is not a problem, in and of itself, because it can be shown that, under
mild restrictions, the budget constraint is always more curved in an interior solution than
the indifference curves are. However, for the sake of simplicity and to facilitate the graphical
exposition, it is more convenient to use a monotonic transformation of the retirement age
(rather than R itself) as the retirement choice variable. In particular, we deﬁne the auxiliary




e−[rs+M(s)]ds, for 0 ≤ u ≤ R. (27)
Clearly, S is a continuous, monotonically increasing transformation of R for a given age u,
which ensures that the inverse function, R = R(u,S), also exists. In Figure 1(d) the transfor-
mation from R to S for a newborn (i.e. S(0,R)) is illustrated, using a Gompertz-Makeham
(G-M hereafter) mortality process ﬁtted to the cohort born in the Netherlands in 1920 (as in
Heijdra and Romp, 2005, 2006).12 The concave shape of the transformation stretches the S
intervals for young ages and compacts these intervals for old ages.
12For the G-M process, the instantaneous mortality rate is m(s) = µ0 + µ1eµ2s, and the cumulative mor-
12Figure 1: Optimal Retirement and the Transformed Retirement Age
13For a general demography, the inverse function, R(u,S), is only deﬁned implicitly by
equation (27).13 The derivative of this inverse function is given by:
∂R
∂S
= e−ru−M(u)erR(u,S)+M(R(u,S)) > 0. (28)
Where no confusion arises we drop the dependency of R on S and u from here on. For future
reference we note that the EEA, utility-maximizing, and lifetime-income maximizing values
for S are given by, respectively, SE = S(u,RE), S∗ = S(u,R∗), and SI = S(u,RI).
The slope and curvature of the indifference curves in (li,S)-space are obtained by implicit


















































The indifference curves are upward sloping, since postponing retirement causes additional
disutility of labour which must be compensated with a higher lifetime income. By assump-
tion D0(R) ≥ 0 and r > θ, so the indifference curves are convex. In panel (a) of Figure 1 an
indifference curve for a newborn is illustrated—see the curve labelled ¯ Λ∗.
By differentiating (26), noting (24) and (28), we ﬁnd that the slope and curvature of the
li(u,S) curve are given by:
dli
dS
= ¯ w(R) = wE(R) > 0, (31)
d2li







By increasing the (transformed) retirement age slightly, lifetime income is increased by an
amount equal to the wage rate facing an agent of age R. Depending on the age proﬁle of
tality factor is M(u) ≡ µ0u + (µ1/µ2)(eµ2u − 1). The parameter estimates (and associated t-statistics) are
ˆ µ0 = 0.2437 × 10−2 (65.8), ˆ µ1 = 0.5520 × 10−4 (20.5), and ˆ µ2 = 0.0964 (138.2); see Heijdra and Romp (2005).
The estimated survival function ﬁts the data rather well. It predicts an average mortality rate of 1.02% per
annum and a proportion of centenarians equal to 0.1%.








, for R ≥ 0,






1− (r + µ0)Se−(r+µ0)u
i
, for 0 ≤ S < e(r+µ0)u/(r + µ0).
14wages, the budget constraint may contain convex segments (for ¯ w0 (R) > 0), linear seg-
ments (for ¯ w0 (R) = 0), and concave segments (for ¯ w0 (R) < 0). The economically relevant
case, however, appears to be that the wage is either constant or declining with age around
the optimal age of retirement—see OECD (1998, p. 133) for empirical evidence on OECD
countries. To streamline the discussion, we adopt the following assumption.
Assumption 1 The wage schedule is non-increasing around the optimal retirement age and
beyond, i.e. ¯ w0 (R) ≤ 0 for R ≥ R∗.
In Figure 1(a) we illustrate the linear budget constraint that results for the special case of
an age-invariant wage rate ( ¯ w0 (R) = 0 for all R). The optimum is located at point E0, where
there exists a tangency between the lifetime budget line and an indifference curve. Panel (b)
shows the same equilibrium in (li,R)-space.
3.2 Ageing effects
Our model distinguishes both biological and economic age dependencies. A biological age-
ing effect involves changes in the mortality structure, as captured by the mortality function
M(u,ψm), where ψm is a shift parameter (see Section 2.2 and below). Economic ageing, on
the other hand, refers to changes in the disutility of working or in the efﬁciency of labour
over the life cycle, as captured by the functions D(u,ψd) and E(u,ψe), respectively, where
ψd and ψe are the associated shift parameters. In the remainder of this section we focus on
the retirement decision of a newborn, i.e. we set u = ¯ a(u) = 0 in equations (25)–(26). This
entails no loss of generality because the agent’s plans are dynamically consistent, i.e. the
optimal retirement age is age-invariant.
Economic ageing In Figure 2(a) we illustrate the effect on lifetime income and the optimal
retirement age of a change in the disutility of labour, i.e. ∂D(u,ψd)/∂ψd ≤ 0 for all u,
with strict inequality around u = R∗. Such a preference shock leaves the budget constraint

















The indifference curves become ﬂatter and the agent chooses a higher retirement age as a
result—see the move from E0 to E1 in Figure 2(a).
In Figure 2(b) we depict the comparative static effect of a change in the age proﬁle of
labour efﬁciency, i.e. ∂E(u,ψe)/∂ψe ≥ 0 with strict inequality for u = R∗. Indifference






























(a) Reduced Disutility of Working (b) Increase in Labour Productivity
Figure 2: Economic Ageing Shocks
such a shock are complicated because there are offsetting wealth- and substitution effects. It








e−[rs+M(s)]ds > 0, (34)











In Figure 2(b) we illustrate the case for which the optimal retirement age increases. The
budget constraint rotates in a counter-clockwise direction and the optimum shifts from E0
to E1. The total effect can be decomposed into a negative wealth effect (from E0 to E0) and a
positive substitution effect (from E0 to E1).
Biologicalageing Twotypesofdemographicshocksareconsideredinouranalysis, namely
a change in the birth rate and a change in the mortality process. Clearly, in view of (25)–(26),
the birth rate does not directly affect the retirement choice of individual agents.14 The mor-
tality process, however, does affect the ∆(u,λ) function (deﬁned in (11) above) and thus the
optimal retirement choice. As we pointed out in Section 2.2 above, we write the instanta-
14Of course, in general equilibrium the birth rate may affect the retirement choice via the ﬁscal system. See
Section 6 for a further analysis.

























































(a) Mortality rate, m(u) = µ0 + µ1eµ2u (b) Surviving fraction, SF(u) = e−M(u)
Figure 3: Reduced Adult Mortality
neous mortality rate as m(s,ψm), where ψm is a shift parameter.15 In order to investigate the
effects of a change in ψm we make the following assumptions.
Assumption 2 The mortality function has the following properties:




(ii) m(s,ψm) is convex in age,
∂2m(s,ψm)
∂s2 ≥ 0;








An example of a mortality shock satisfying all the requirements of Assumption 2 consists
of a decrease in µ1 or µ2 of the G-M mortality function. In terms of Figure 3(a), the shock
shifts the mortality function downward, with the reduction in mortality being increasing
in age. In panel (b) the function for the surviving fraction of the population shifts to the
right. The shock that we consider can thus be interpreted as a reduction in adult mortality.
Of course, in view of the terminology of Assumption 2, an increase in ψm leads to an in-
crease in the expected remaining lifetime for all ages. Assumption 2 enables us to establish
Proposition 2.
15In the Blanchard case, which has only one parameter, µ0 could be −ψm or any decreasing function of ψm.
The G-M process, stated in footnote 12, depends on three parameters. Hence, the parameter vector is a function
of ψm, i.e. (µ0,µ1,µ2) = f (ψm). An increase in ψm should result in such a change that the G-M mortality
function decreases for all ages as ψm increases.
17Proposition 2 Deﬁne M(u,ψm) ≡
R u
0 m(s,ψm)ds and ∆(u,λ,ψm) ≡ eλu+M(u,ψm) ×
R ∞









Proof: see Heijdra and Romp (2006). ¤
The effect of biological ageing on the retirement decision can now be studied. We prove













where ω0 is a positive constant. As is clear from (13), the retirement decision depends criti-
callyonthemarginalutilityofconsumption,U0 (¯ c(0)), where ¯ c(0) ≡ li(0,R,ψm)/∆(0,r∗,ψm)
is consumption of a newborn. Ageing thus affects both the denominator and the numerator
of the expression for ¯ c(0). Clearly, the sign of the comparative static effect is determined by
the term in square brackets on the right-hand side of (36). Using Proposition 2(ii) we ﬁnd
that ∂∆(0,r∗,ψm)/∂ψm > 0 so the propensity effect operates in the direction of increasing the
retirement date. Ceteris paribus lifetime income, an increase in ∆(0,r∗,ψm) reduces ¯ c(0)
and increases U0 (¯ c(0)). This boosts the marginal beneﬁt of retiring later.













The ﬁrst term on the right-hand side is positive (see Proposition 2(i)), i.e. as a result of
reduced discounting of wage income, lifetime income increases. But lighter discounting also
increases the lifetime burden of the poll tax, i.e. the second term on the right-hand side is
also positive. As a result, the wage effect moves in the opposite direction of the tax effect
and the net effect of ageing on lifetime income cannot be signed a priori. Of course, in the
absence of poll taxes, the lifetime-income effect is positive and thus works in the direction
of decreasing the retirement age. There is a strong presumption, however, that the ﬁrst term
on the right-hand side of (37) is rather small. Indeed, as can be gleaned from Figure 3(a),
an adult mortality shock starts to matter quantitatively for age levels at which most agents
have already retired in advanced countries. Hence, the retirement age is likely to increase as
longevityincreasesbecausethetaxeffectisdominant, i.e. dR∗/dψm > 0inrealisticscenarios.
In Figure 4 we illustrate the comparative static effects of increased longevity. In panel (d),
the mortality shock increases the transformed retirement age at all values of R, though more
18so for higher ages. Intuitively, by making the transformation curve steeper, a post-shock
octogenarian is “younger” than his/her pre-shock counterpart. As a result, the indifference
curves in panel (a) ﬂatten out so that, with a linear budget constraint (with ¯ w0 (R) = 0), the
equilibrium shifts from E0 to E1. In panel (b) the same comparative static effect is shown in
(li,R)-space.
4 Realistic Pension System
In this section we re-introduce the public pension system and investigate its likely conse-
quences for the trade-offs facing workers in advanced economies. As in the previous sec-
tion, we continue to assume that the pension system is in a steady state. As a result, social












By incorporating social security wealth into the steady-state budget constraint (26) and dif-







(1− tL) ¯ w(R) + B0 (R)Π(R,RE,∞,r) > 0 for S < SE
(1− tL) ¯ w(R) + B0 (R)∆(R,r) − B(R) ≥ 0 for SE ≤ S ≤ SI
(39)
where RE and RI (SE and SI) are, respectively, the (transformed) EEA and lifetime-income
maximizing retirement age—see the discussion below equation (28).16 The Π(·) term ap-
pearing in the upper branch of (39) is deﬁned in general terms as:




In economic terms, Π(u,u, ¯ u,λ) represents the present value of an annuity that one receives
duringtheageinterval(u, ¯ u), evaluatedatage u, usingthediscountrate λ. Thedemographic
discount function, ∆(u,λ), deﬁned in (11) above, is a special case of Π(u,u, ¯ u,λ), with u = u
and ¯ u = ∞. As is evident from (39), the shape, slope, and curvature of the budget constraint
are all complicated by the existence of the EEA. If B(R) and B0 (R) are both continuous at
R = RE, then the budget constraint is continuous but features a kink at that point equal to
−B(RE). The kink represents the retirement beneﬁt that is foregone by not retiring at RE but
at some later age.
The curvature of the lifetime income function is ambiguous in general, i.e. it cannot be
inferred from theoretical ﬁrst principles whether or not it is concave in the relevant region.
Our reading of the empirical comparative-institutional literature for OECD countries, how-
ever, give us enough conﬁdence to formulate the following assumption.
16In the presence of a public pension system, RI is deﬁned implicitly by ∆(RI,r) = B(RI) − (1− tL)w(RI).
Since B0 (RI) ≥ 0, ¯ w0 (RI) ≤ 0 (Assumption 1) and ∂∆(RI,r)/∂RI < 0 (Proposition 1(v)), it follows that there

































Figure 4: Retirement and Increased Longevity
20Assumption 3 In the relevant calender age domain of 55 to 70, the lifetime income function
is concave in the transformed retirement age S. It may feature a single kink at the EEA.
Our defense for this assumption takes up the remainder of this section and proceeds as fol-
lows. In the literature (e.g. Gruber and Wise, 1999, 2004; OECD, 2005), retirement incentives
are typically summarized with the EEA, the NRA, the replacement rate, the pattern of bene-
ﬁt accrual, and the implicit tax rate. Using these incentive indicators, it is possible to derive
the shape and slope of the lifetime income function.
The replacement rate is deﬁned as the ratio of the retirement beneﬁt to net wages. In terms
of our theoretical framework, the replacement rate RR for someone retiring at or after the
EEA is given by:
RR(R) ≡
B(R)
(1− tL) ¯ w(R)
for R ≥ RE. (41)
This replacement rate differs greatly between countries, but also between ages. As can be
seen from Table A.1 in Appendix C, the replacement rate for France starts at 92% at the EEA
(59 years) and slowly increases to 96% thereafter. In contrast, in Canada the replacement rate
starts at 18% at age 59, after which it increases to 91% for an 69 year old.
The beneﬁt accrual is the nominal change in social security wealth if one postpones retire-
ment by one year (i.e., it is ∂SSW/∂R in terms of our model). The beneﬁt accrual depends
on the age of the individual. To compare accrual levels, we can either hold constant the
age at which social security wealth is evaluated or evaluate social security wealth at the ac-
tual retirement age. Both methods have their advantages and drawbacks. The ﬁrst makes
it easier to track social security wealth over time, the second allows for easier comparison
of retirement incentives at the retirement age. In this paper we will use the second deﬁni-
tion because it allows for easier mathematics in the transformed retirement age S-space. By











B0(R)Π(R,RE,∞,r) − tL ¯ w(R) for R < RE
B0(R)∆(R,r) − tL ¯ w(R) − B(R) for R > RE
(42)
The level of beneﬁt accrual is closely connected to the slope of the lifetime income function
(as a function of S). Indeed, by combining (39) and (42) we obtain:
dli
dS
= ACC(R) + ¯ w(R). (43)
Inthiscontext, actuarialadjustmentofthepensionbeneﬁtiscalledfairifandonlyifACC(R) =
0 for all R, i.e. tL ¯ w(R) = B0(R)Π(R,RE,∞,r) = B0(R)∆(R,r) − B(R).17
17As Gruber and Wise put it, under a less than actuarially fair system, “once beneﬁts are available, a person
who continues to work for an additionalyear will typically receive less in social security beneﬁts over his lifetime
than if he quit work and started to receive beneﬁts at the ﬁrst opportunity” (2005, p. 5). See stylized fact (SF4).
21The beneﬁt accrual depends on the monetary units in which social retirement beneﬁts
are measured and the age at which the social security wealth is evaluated. Most studies
standardize the beneﬁt accrual either with the level of social security wealth or with the
present value of net wages. The ﬁrst measure is the accrual rate, the second measure is the
implicit subsidy.
The negative of the implicit subsidy is the implicit tax rate (IT), measuring the additional
tax rate one ‘implicitly’ faces over and above the normal taxes. A negative accrual is an ad-
ditional tax on labour and discourages work. Conversely, a positive accrual is an implicit
subsidy on labour and encourages the individual to work an additional year. Since we eval-
uate the accrual level at the retirement age, we should not discount the net wage rate, so the
implicit tax can be written in terms of our model as:18
IT(R) ≡ −
ACC(R)
(1− tL) ¯ w(R)
. (44)
By substituting this expression for the implicit tax rate into equation (43), we can write the
slope of the lifetime income function as:
dli
dS







Under the maintained assumption that gross wages are constant for higher ages (typically
in the range 55–70), equation (45) can be used to compute the shape of the lifetime income
function. Dividing lifetime income by net wages gives a ‘standardized’ measure of lifetime
income which is more easily comparable between countries. The only caveat is that we do
not have data on the relevant labour income tax, so we cannot estimate 1/(1 − tL). This
is not a problem, however, because we are only interested in the curvature of the lifetime
income function (its convexity or concavity). The term 1/(1 − tL) only inﬂuences the slope
of the lifetime income proﬁle, but it has no effect on its curvature. To get an idea of the shape
of the lifetime income proﬁle we proceed as if there are no labour income taxes. Since the
fraction 1/(1 − tL) has a lower bound of 1 (because in reality taxes are positive), we thus
obtain a conservative estimate for lifetime income.
Figure 5 shows the lifetime income proﬁles for nine OECD countries, as we computed
them using the implicit tax rates published in Gruber and Wise (1999). For convenience these
tax rates have also been reported in Table A.2 in Appendix C. The lifetime income proﬁles
are normalized at age 54 to enable comparison between countries. The graphs contain two
horizontal axes. The main (lower) horizontal axis measures the transformed retirement age,
S, whilst the secondary (upper) axis shows the corresponding values for the untransformed
retirement age, R. The effect of the non-monotonic scaling is clearly visible.
18Some contributors to Gruber and Wise (1999, 2004) do not provide information concerning the age at which
they evaluate the present value of social security wealth. This is not a problem, however, provided we do not
use the accrual levels, but the accrual rates or implicit tax rates.
22Figure 5(a) characterizes the retirement systems in continental Europe. Lifetime income
proﬁles are increasing in the retirement age, more or less concave and usually have a clear
kink at the EEA (which is 60 years in most countries, but only 55 in Italy) or at the NRA (65
years). A notable exception is formed by the Netherlands. Its proﬁle has a sharp spike at
age 59 and decreases until the NRA of 65. The pension system in the Netherlands is such
that there exists an implicit tax of more than 141% of net earnings. The pension beneﬁts
someone receives hardly increases if someone retires after age 59, but one still has to pay
contributions to the pension system. Moreover, replacement rates are very high due to the
usually generous, but mandatory, company pension systems. It is not surprising that most
employees in the Netherlands retire at age 60.19
Figure 5(b) characterizes the retirement systems in Canada, Japan, the United Kingdom,
and the United States. A feature of these systems is the rather low implicit tax rates. A low
implicit tax is a symptom of either (i) a near-actuarially fair system, or (ii) a rather poorly
developed pension system.20 As a result of the small implicit tax rates, the wage effect in the
lifetime income function (45) is dominant and the standardized lifetime income proﬁles are
roughly the same in these four countries.
Although Figure 5 only shows conservative estimates for the lifetime income proﬁles, it
does give an accurate picture concerning the shape of these proﬁles. Apart from Spain and
the Netherlands, the income proﬁles are concave and may feature a kink at the EEA. Even
though the proﬁle for the Netherlands is not concave, there is a pronounced kink at age 60
which precludes individuals from working beyond that age.
5 Tax and Pension Shocks
In this section we study the comparative static effects on the optimal steady-state retirement
age of various marginal changes in the tax system or the public pension scheme. In view
of Assumption 3 and because indifference curves are convex in (li,S)-space, the optimum
retirement age is unique. If there is no kink in the lifetime income proﬁle, then there will
be an interior solution. In the presence of a single kink, however, there are three possible
outcomes. First, if the agent’s disutility of labour is high, and indifference curves are rela-
tively steep, then the interior optimum occurs to the left of the kink, i.e. the agent chooses
R∗ < RE, contra stylized fact (SF3). Second, if labour disutility is moderate, then indifference
curves are relatively ﬂat and there will be a corner solution at the kink, i.e. R∗ = RE. Third,
if labour disutility is very low then there will be an interior solution to the right of the EEA,
i.e. R∗ > RE. The second and third cases are not inconsistent with reality.
19The graph is based on retirement schemes as they existed in the late 1980s. More recent ﬁgures published in
Gruber and Wise (2004) provide a qualitatively similar picture.
20The former is the case in Canada and the United States, whereas the latter is relevant for the United King-
dom. Japan is a somewhat mixed case.




















































































(a) Continental Europe (b) Other Countries
Source: Gruber and Wise (1999) and own calculations.
Figure 5: Lifetime Income Proﬁles for Nine OECD Countries (Lower Bound)
24dR∗
d¯ z





























Note: ζ0 > 0 and ζ1 > 0. See Appendix D.
Table 1: Taxes, the Pension System, and the Optimal Retirement Age
In this section we focus on the interior solutions because an optimum occurring at the
kink in the lifetime income proﬁle is insensitive to small changes. In addition, we assume
that the retirement age is strictly larger than the EEA (R∗ > RE). For convenience, we sum-
marize the comparative static results in Table 1, and provide details of the derivations in
Appendix D.
Taxes Changes in the tax system affect the optimal retirement age in the following way.
First, an increase in the poll tax leads to a reduction in lifetime income and an increase in the
retirement age; see equation (T1.1). Intuitively, the tax change induces a pure wealth effect.
Because consumption and leisure are both normal goods, labour supply is increased, i.e. the
agent retires later in life.
Second, a change in the labour income tax rate has an ambiguous effect; see equation
(T1.2). The ﬁrst term on the right-hand side of (T1.2) represents the substitution effect, which
is negative. A higher tax discourages working and thus encourages retiring earlier in life via
that effect. The second term is the positive wealth effect. The tax increase makes the agent
poorer and thus provides incentives to retire later in life. In summary, the labour income tax
increase operates qualitatively like a decrease in labour efﬁciency (see equations (34)–(35)
and Figure 2(b)).
Pension system Changes in the pension system affect the retirement decision as follows.21
First, holding constant the slope of the retirement beneﬁt curve, the effect of a change in
21Following Sheshinski (1978, pp. 357-8), we write the pension beneﬁt as B(R,ψb), where ψb is a shift param-
eter. The ﬁrst pension shock assumes ∂B/∂ψb > 0 and ∂2B/∂ψb∂R = 0. The second shock sets ∂B/∂ψb = 0 and
∂2B/∂ψb∂R > 0.
25its level is negative; see equation (T1.3). In this case the wealth- and substitution effects
operate in the same direction. The ﬁrst term on the right-hand side of (T1.3) is the negative
substitution effect: by increasing the public retirement beneﬁt the rewards to working longer
are reduced, i.e. the lower branch of the budget constraint (39) is rotated in a clockwise
fashion. The second term on the right-hand side of (T1.3) is the negative wealth effect. The
beneﬁt increase boosts lifetime income and thus induces agents to work less and to retire
earlier in life. In graphical terms, the wealth effect leads to an upward ship of the lifetime
budget constraint.
Second, ceteris paribus the level of the beneﬁt function, a change in its slope causes a
positive substitution effect; see equation (T1.4). Intuitively, the steeper slope of the beneﬁt
function induces agents to postpone retirement somewhat. In graphical terms, the budget
constraint rotates counter-clockwise and the optimal retirement age shifts to the right.
6 Demographic Change and Policy Reform
In this section we compute and visualize the general equilibrium computational results of
various demographic shocks and their assumed ﬁscal reform measures. We restrict attention
on measures characterizing the aggregate economy. Per capita consumption, for example, is
computed as c(t) ≡
R t
−∞ l(v,t)¯ c(v,t)dv, where the relative cohort weight, l(v,t), is deﬁned
in equation (16) above, and individual consumption, ¯ c(v,t), is given in (9). Other per capita
variables are deﬁned in a similar fashion.
In accordance with stylized fact (SF4), we calibrate the model in such a way that the
initial optimum retirement age is at the EEA, i.e. the budget constraint features a kink at
the EEA and individual agent are ‘stuck’ in this corner solution. The main demographic
and economic features of the calibrated model are as follows. The mortality process is as
mentioned in footnote 12. It represents the ﬁtted G-M process for the cohort born in 1920
in the Netherlands. Life expectancy at birth for this cohort is 65.5 years. The crude birth
rate is set at b = 0.0237, a value that lies in between the observed birth rates of 1920 and
1940 (see Heijdra and Romp, 2006). In combination, the demographic parameters imply
an initial steady-state population growth rate equal to ˆ n0 = 0.0134. For households we
assume that the world interest rate facing them equals r = 0.05, the rate of time preference
is θ = 0.03, and the intertemporal substitution elasticity is σ = 0.8. In combination, these
parameter values imply an annual consumption growth for individuals of ˙ ¯ c(v,t)/¯ c(v,t) =
σ[r − θ] = 0.016. Disutility of labour and labour efﬁciency are both age-invariant and set at,
respectively, D(u) = 0.15 and E(u) = 10. On the production side, we set the share of capital
in the production function at ε = 0.4, the technology index is AY = 1, and the depreciation
rate of capital is δ = 0.06. For the policy parameters we use the following values. The labour
income tax is tL = 0.1, the poll tax is ¯ z0 = −0.166, the initial debt level is ˆ d0 = 10, and the
EEA is set at RE = 60. For somebody who retires before the EEA, pension beneﬁts are zero
26(a) Assets (ˆ ¯ a(u))








(b) Lifetime income (b li(u))








Figure 6: Individual Steady-State Wealth Proﬁles
until the EEA and equal to β0 = 7.094 from age EEA onward (this value for β0 amounts to
50% of an agent’s gross wage). For somebody retiring at or after the EEA, pension beneﬁts
are zero until actual retirement, and equal to β0 + β1 (R − RE) from age R onward, where
β1 = 0.05.
For future reference, we visualize the steady-state age proﬁles of ﬁnancial assets and life-
time income in Figure 6. In Panel (a) shows that the proﬁle for assets is inverse U-shaped and
reaches a peak at u = RE. After retirement, the agent slowly decumulates its assets. Panel (b)
shows that there is a kink in the proﬁle for lifetime income at u = RE. The initial steady state
has the following aggregate features: ˆ w = 14.2, ˆ a0 = 100.5, b li0 = 184.4, ˆ h0 = 9.0, ˆ y0 = 21.2,
ˆ c0 = 16.0, b i0 = 5.7, ˆ k0 = 77.0, and ˆ f0 = 13.5. The output shares of consumption, investment,
net exports, and the government primary surplus are, respectively, 75.6%, 26.7%, −2.3% and
1.73%. For convenience we summarize the initial steady state in column (1) of Table 2. Our
model economy is clearly not a banana republic. It is a wealthy country ruled by a ﬁscally
responsible government (that is running a primary surplus), and populated by long-lived
and patient citizens (who as a group hold a net claim on the rest of the world).
The comparative dynamic exercises performed throughout this section take the follow-
27(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Initial Baby bust Mortality Baby bust Mortality
st. st. ¯ z adjusts ¯ z adjusts tL adjusts RE adjusts
µ1 5.61× 10−5 5.61× 10−5 2.80 × 10−5 5.61× 10−5 2.80 × 10−5
µ2 0.09616 0.09616 0.0867 0.09616 0.0867
∆(0,0) 65.5 65.5 81.6 65.5 81.6
b 0.02365 0.01774 0.02365 0.01774 0.02365
R∗ 60 60 60 60 62.13
ˆ n 0.0134 0.0043 0.0163 0.0043 0.0163
TR 20 40 20 40
tL 0.100 0.100 0.100 0.142 0.100
RE 60 60 60 60 61.7
¯ z −0.166 0.343 −0.057 −0.166 −0.166
ˆ d 10.0 11.1 −1.4 10.9 −1.2
ˆ a 100.5 107.9 134.9 105.8 134.6
b li 184.4 165.4 188.1 166.0 191.6
ˆ h 9.0 8.5 8.5 8.5 8.6
ˆ y 21.2 20.2 20.0 20.2 20.3
ˆ c 16.0 16.5 16.4 16.4 16.6
ˆ i 5.7 4.7 5.5 4.7 5.6
ˆ f 13.5 23.5 60.8 21.5 59.7
ˆ k 77.0 73.3 72.7 73.3 73.7
ˆ c/ˆ y 0.756 0.820 0.820 0.815 0.812
ˆ i/ˆ y 0.267 0.278 0.280 0.234 0.278
Bold entries: Exogenous shocks
Italic entries: Policy instruments
Table 2: Initial Steady State and Long-Run Effects


















































(a) Baby Bust (b) Reduced Adult Mortality
Figure 7: Steady State Population Composition
ing form. Starting from the initial steady state, the economy is hit by one of two types of
demographic change occurring at time t = 0, namely a baby bust or an increase in longevity
(reduced adult mortality). In both cases, the demographic shock renders the public pension
system ﬁscally unsustainable in the long run, conform stylized fact (SF1). At time t = 0,
however, the policy maker announces a policy reform—to be implemented at some later
date, TR > 0—which restores ﬁscal sustainability. The announcement is believed by individ-
ual agents as the policy maker has been credible in the past.
We study the effects of three types of policy reform. In Section 6.1 we assume that the
policy maker engineers a once-off change in the poll tax, ¯ z, at time t = TR which restores
government solvency. The policy response is the same for the two types of demographic
change. In keeping the poll tax time-invariant, both before and after the reform, the govern-
ment engages in tax smoothing.
In Section 6.2 we assume that the policy maker uses different instruments to address the
two types of demographic change. For the baby bust, the policy response consists of a once-
off increase in the labour income tax rate, tL, occurring at time t = TR. This is again a tax
smoothing scenario as tL is time-invariant both before and after the shock. For the longevity
shock, the policy response consists of a permanent increase in the EEA, occurring at time
t = TR, which restores solvability without any further tax changes.
296.1 Tax reform
Throughout this subsection the announced policy reform consists of a once-off change in the
poll tax which makes government ﬁnances healthy again.
Baby bust The effects of a once-off decrease in the birth rate occurring at time t = 0 are
visualized in Figures 7(a), 8 and 9(a). The baby bust causes a twenty-ﬁve percent decrease
in the birth rate, from b0 = 0.0237 to b1 = 0.0177. It is assumed that policy reform is im-
plemented twenty years after the baby bust, i.e. TR = 20 in these ﬁgures. Since this reform
has no effect on the kink in the lifetime income proﬁle, individuals continue to retire at
the EEA. Figure 7(a) depicts the change in the steady-state age composition of the popula-
tion. The mass of the distribution is moved from younger to older ages. Figure 8(a) shows
the demographic transition due the baby bust.22 There is an immediate drop in the pop-
ulation growth rate because the arrival rate of new agents has decreased permanently, i.e.
n(0) − ˆ n0 = b1 − b0. Following the initial jump, n(t) adjusts in a non-monotonic fashion to
the new demographic equilibrium at ˆ n1 = 0.0043.
Figure 8(b) illustrates the transition path for per capita employment in efﬁciency units
(Recall that the paths for per capita output and physical capital are both proportional to
h(t)—see equations (22) and (23) above). Employment declines in a non-monotonic fashion,
from ˆ h0 = 9.0 to ˆ h1 = 8.5. There is a gradual decline in h(t) from t = 0 until t = 60 both
because fewer workers enter the labour force than before the shock and because the larger
pre-shock cohorts retire. At time t = 60, the path for h(t) starts to rise again because the
ﬂow of retirees consists entirely of relatively small post-shock cohorts. Beyond t = 60, the
path for employment converges in a cyclical fashion to the new steady state.
Figure 8(c) depicts the adjustment path for per capita consumption. At impact, consump-
tion falls because all pre-shock generations anticipate the future poll tax increase and cut
their consumption level accordingly. During the ﬁrst half century following the shock con-
sumption rises due to a strong numerator effect caused by the reduction in the population
growth rate. Consumption reaches a peak at the point where the weight of the relatively rich
pre-shock cohorts starts to dwindle as a result of mortality. Consumption declines thereafter
because post-shock generations have a lower consumption level due to the heavier poll tax
burden they are faced with during their lifetimes. The path of asset income, depicted in Fig-
ure 8(d) shows the strong savings response that occurs during the time period 0 < t < TR.
Agents anticipate the higher taxes from TR onward and save more than before the shock. At
time TR, the slope of the asset path is reduced because the tax increase is implemented. Even-
tually, the last of the relatively large pre-shock cohorts enter retirement and start to dissave
so that aggregate assets fall somewhat. The long-run effect of the baby bust is an increase in
22As is shown by Heijdra and Romp (2006), equation (17) is a linear Volterra equation of the second kind which
can be solved by numerical means.
30per capita assets from ˆ a0 = 100.5 to ˆ a1 = 107.9.
Figure 8(e) illustrates the path of per capita government debt. The baby bust destabilizes
the public pension system and leads to a gradual build up of government debt in the pre-
reform period, 0 < t < TR. At time TR, the poll tax is increased, solvency is restored, and
the government can redeem some of its outstanding debt obligations. Interestingly, the post-
reform transition path is non-monotonic because the relatively large pre-shock cohorts die
and thus stop paying taxes. In the long run, the baby bust leads to an increase in per capita
debt from ˆ d0 = 10 to ˆ d1 = 11.1.
Finally, in Figure 8(e) we plot the adjustment path for net foreign assets. Obviously, since
a(t) = k(t) + d(t) + f (t), the path for net foreign assets mirrors that of total assets, the
capital stock, and government debt. During the ﬁrst half century of adjustment, agent’s
strong savings response (panel (d)) coincides with the accumulation of net foreign assets.
Note that at time TR the government starts to redeem public debt, i.e. both k(t) and d(t) are
falling immediately after TR. Total assets are still rising, however, so it follows that foreign
asset accumulation continues quite vigorously even after the tax reform has taken place. The
long-run effect of the baby bust consists of an increase in net foreign assets from ˆ f0 = 13.5
to ˆ f1 = 23.5. For convenience we summarize the quantitative results of the baby bust in
column (2) of Table 2.
In Figure 9(a) we illustrate the change in welfare experienced by the different gener-
ations. To facilitate the interpretation of the effects, we present equivalent-variation (EV)
measures expressed in terms of initial wealth level. For pre-shock generations (v ≤ 0) we
compute the change in lifetime utility from the perspective of the shock period (t = 0), i.e.
we plot the EV-value of d ¯ Λ(v,0) for v ≤ 0. In contrast, for post-shock generations (v > 0),
we compute the welfare change from the perspective of their birth date, i.e. we plot the
EV-value of d ¯ Λ(v,v) for v > 0 in Figure 9. The welfare effects of the baby bust are straight-
forward. All generations lose out as a result of the poll tax increase. For old pre-shock
generations the welfare effect is small. These generations have a very short time horizon
and for them the tax increase that will occur only at time TR = 20 hardly poses any burden
at all. The younger the pre-shock generations are, the heavier the burden of the anticipated
tax increase become. Similarly, for post-shock generations the welfare loss becomes larger
the closer they are born to the time at which the tax increase takes place. Worst off are those
generations born at or after TR: the welfare loss is about 4 percent of initial wealth for them.
Increased longevity The effect of an embodied23 longevity shock occurring at time t =
0 are visualized in Figures 7(b), 10 and 9(b) (welfare effects). The effect on the mortality
rate itself is illustrated Figure 3(a). The increased longevity is parameterized by reducing
the µ1 parameter of the G-M process by 50 percent and the µ2 parameter by 10 percent.
23An embodied mortality shock is such that it only affects generations born after the shock. The mortality
process for pre-shock generations is unaffected. See Heijdra and Romp (2006).
31This results in an increase in life expectancy at birth from 65.5 to 77.6. Figure 7(b) depicts
the long-run effect on the age composition of the population. The population pyramid is
squeezed for ages up to about 62, but is thickened for higher ages. Figure 10(a) shows that
the demographic transition, following an embodied longevity shock, is rather slow. Indeed,
even 30 years after the shock the population growth rate is virtually at its initial steady-
state level. For that reason we assume that the policy reform is implemented 40 years after
the longevity shock, i.e. TR = 40 in Figures 10 and 9(b). Just as for the baby bust, the tax
reform has no effect on the retirement choice, i.e. pre-shock and post-shock agents all retire
at the EEA. It follows that post-shock agents expect a much longer retirement period than
pre-shock agents do.
The quantitative long-run effects of the longevity shock have been reported in column
(3) of Table 2. The key features of the transition paths in Figure 10 are as follows. In Figure
10(b), employment is virtually constant until the tax reform takes place and rises slightly
thereafter. People live longer so the inﬂow into the labour market exceeds the outﬂow. For
RE < t < 90 there is a sharp decrease in employment because the post-shock cohorts start to
retire. Because their longevity is higher than for the pre-shock cohorts, the retiring cohorts
are relatively large and the outﬂow from the labour market is huge. In the new steady
state, employment is permanently lower because the weight of retirees is larger than before.
People live longer but they do not work for a longer period of time. As a result, per capita
employment falls.
Figure 10(c) depicts the adjustment path for consumption. For t < RE, per capita con-
sumption falls because post-shock newborns consume less than pre-shock newborns, i.e.
the negative horizon effect dominates the positive lifetime-income effect. Consumption
rises again for RE < t < 90. Pre-shock generations have all passed away but post-shock
generations—who live longer lives—have a relatively high consumption level later on in
life. In the new steady state per capita consumption is higher as a result. Figure 10(d) shows
that per capita assets rise during the transition. As is shown in Figure 6(a), the individual
age proﬁle for assets is increasing up to age u = RE. The longevity shock implies that larger
population fractions ultimately reach the EEA and beyond. As result, per capita assets in-
crease.
Figure 10(e) shows that public debt is virtually constant for 0 < t < TR. This is because
the longevity shock takes a long time before it starts to seriously affect the government ﬁ-
nances. Were the government to do nothing, debt would ultimately explode, conform styl-
ized fact (SF1). However, our ﬁscally responsible government slightly increases the poll tax
from TR onward, thus making room for higher future outlays on pension payments. Figure
10(f) shows that net foreign assets rise during the transition.
The welfare effects of the longevity shock are visualized in Figure 9(b). Just as for the
baby bust, (a) all generations lose out as a result of the poll tax increase and (b) welfare
losses are increasing in the generations index, v. Because the tax increase is much smaller
32than for the baby bust scenario, the welfare losses are smaller for all generations.
6.2 Pension reform
In this subsection the announced pension reform is assumed to be speciﬁc to the type of
demographic shock hitting the economy. Indeed, we assume that tL is increased following a
baby bust, whereas the EEA is increased in reaction to increased longevity.
Baby bust The quantitative long-run effects of the baby bust have been reported in column
(4) of Table 2. A crucial feature of the solution is that the increase in the labour income tax is
not sufﬁciently large to induce individuals to retire at an age beyond the EEA. Indeed, both
pre-shock and post-shock agents continue to retire at the EEA, and as a result the labour
income tax operates just like a poll tax. The only difference between the two scenarios is that
retirees do not have to pay the labour income tax, whereas they do pay the poll tax. For this
reason, the welfare proﬁles are slightly different for the two scenarios. Comparing Figures
9(a) and (c) we ﬁnd that the welfare loss is zero for all pre-shock cohorts older than RE − TR
in the labour tax scenario. These generations will be retired from the labour force by the time
the tax reform is implemented.
Increased longevity In column (5) of Table 2, and Figures 11 and 9(d) we characterize
the effects of the longevity shock. The EEA is increased at time TR in such a way that the
government maintains solvency. This implies that the EEA rises from RE0 = 60 to RE1 =
61.7. For 0 < t < TR agents continue to retire at age RE0 but thereafter agents retire almost
a year later in life, at RE1. Comparing Figures 10 and 11 we ﬁnd that the main difference
between the poll and EEA scenarios is found in the adjustment path for employment (panel
(b) in these ﬁgures). In Figure 11(b) there is a sharp increase in employment at time TR
because nobody retires at that time. Some pre-shock generations delay their retirement by
0.9 years. Since new cohorts continue to enter the labour market, employment rises sharply.
The remainder of the adjustment path is similar as for the poll tax case: there is a sharp
decline at t = RE1 as the ﬁrst of the post-shock cohorts retire.
Comparing Figures 9(b) and (d) we ﬁnd that the welfare effects are rather different for
the two scenarios. Five groups of cohorts can be identiﬁed in Figure 9(d). Group 1 consists
of cohorts whose generations index satisﬁes v < TR − RE1. These cohorts have either already
retired at the time of the shock (t = 0) or will be just old enough at the time of the policy
reform (TR) to retire at that time and receive beneﬁts immediately. This means that at time
t = TR such agents must be at least RE1 years of age. For these generations there is no welfare
loss as a result of the anticipated EEA perform. They continue to retire at age RE0.
Groups 2 and 3 are cohorts for which TR − RE1 < v < TR − RE0. Agents in this group
face a choice. Option 1: they can either retire early at age RE0 (the old EEA) and be without
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Figure 8: Aggregate Effect of a Baby Bust (¯ z balances the budget)


















(a) Baby bust (¯ z adjusted) (b) Mortality shock (¯ z adjusted)

















(c) Baby bust (tL adjusted) (d) Mortality shock (EEA adjusted)
Figure 9: Welfare Effects
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Figure 10: Aggregate Effect of Reduced Adult Mortality (¯ z balances the budget)
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Figure 11: Aggregate Effect of Reduced Adult Mortality (EEA balances the budget)
37income for a brief period of time because they retire too early under the new regime. Option
2: they can adjust their planned retirement age from RE0 to RE1. It turns out that the oldest
generations will choose option 1 whereas the youngest generations will choose option 2,
with the pivotal generation index being at v∗ = −20.5. Agents in both groups experience
a welfare loss as a result of the reform. Interestingly, the welfare loss is increasing in v for
TR − RE1 < v < v∗ but decreasing in v for v∗ < v < TR − RE0.
Group 4 consists of cohorts for which TR − RE0 < v < 0. People in this group did not
have any real choice. At time TR they are too young to retire with beneﬁts under the under
the old regime and thus have to retire at age RE1. Their delayed pension is compensated
partially by higher a level of lifetime income because they have a longer working life. The
welfare loss for agents in this group is decreasing in v.
Finally, group 5 consists of post-shock cohorts for which v > 0. Agents in this group are
all affected equally. They all choose the retirement age RE1 and they all face the same initial
conditions in life.
6.3 Discussion
The key ﬁndings of this section are as follows. First, although both a baby bust and a
longevity boost have an adverse effect on the government’s budget, there is a striking dif-
ference in the speed with which such effects become apparent. Indeed, for the baby bust the
adverse effects show up immediately. Government debt starts to rise immediately after the
shock because the ﬂow of tax payers dwindles. In contrast, for the longevity shock it takes a
very long time before any effect on the government’s balances can be observed.
Second, even though we simulated very large demographic changes, wealth effects are
simply too weak to get agents to move out of the kink and to postpone retirement beyond
the EEA. For a realistic calibration, the implicit tax rates are rather high, ranging from 11.1%
until age 60, jumping to 62.8% at that age, and subsequently rising to 67% at age 70. The
kink in the lifetime income proﬁle acts as a kind of early retirement trap. Changes in the poll
tax or the labour income tax are insufﬁciently powerful instruments to get agents out of the
trap. The welfare costs of the tax increase are non-trivial. Indeed, our simulations show that
post-shock agents experience a welfare loss that is the equivalent of more than 4% of initial
wealth!
Third, an increase in the EEA itself constitutes a rather good policy measure. By increas-
ing the EEA, the kink in the lifetime income proﬁle is shifted to right, and agents retire later
on in life despite the existence of high implicit tax rates. We show that the welfare effects
of the EEA increase are tiny: post-shock agents experience a welfare loss that is the equiva-
lent of less than 0.1% of initial wealth as a result of the EEA increase! Agents not only work
longer but they also get a higher consumption level as a result.
387 Conclusions
We have studied the microeconomic and macroeconomic effects of ageing in the context of a
small open economy populated by disconnected generations of ﬁnitely-lived agents facing
age-dependent mortality and constant factor prices. From a policy perspective, our main
ﬁnding is as follows. Most actual pension systems induce a kink in the lifetime income
function which acts as an early retirement trap. Fiscal changes are not potent enough to get
individuals out of the trap. Increasing the early entitlement age appears to be a low cost
policy measure to counteract the adverse effects of the various demographic shocks.
Our analysis is subject to a number of potentially important limitations, some of which
we will address in the near future. First, in this paper the age proﬁle of labour efﬁciency
is exogenous, i.e. there is no endogenous human capital accumulation decision. In a com-
panion paper we include an endogenous education decision taking place at the beginning
of an agent’s life; see Heijdra and Romp (2006). We have chosen to study start-up education
and retirement in separate papers in order to obtain simple and intuitive results. It is, of
course, quite feasible to combine the two decisions in a single computable general equilib-
rium (CGE). The results in our separate studies can then be of assistance in interpretating the
effects of ageing, pensions, and taxes on the various macroeconomic variables. In our view,
highly stylized analytical models and detailed CGE models are complementary tools for the
public economist.
Second, we only consider once-off changes in the demographic processes. In reality,
demographic changes occur only gradually over time. The main complication lies in the
calculation of the population dynamics, i.e. the population growth rate. The macroeconomic
block of the model (individual optimisation, production, saving) remains the same since the
interest rate is constant in the small open economy. The main difference with the current
stepwise shock is that the transition periods are longer and the costs are spread out over
more generations.
Third, we have focused attention of mortality and have ignored the equally important
issue of morbidity. One of the main functions of a social security system is to support people
who are incapable of working due to old-age related diseases. Asymmetric information
problems arise if health is not perfectly observable to the policy maker. The risk exists that
either social security becomes too expensive because too many people make use of it, while




Robb (1980, p. 424) use a linear space transformation, i.e. instead of using the retirement age
directly, they reformulate their model in terms of years or retirement, T − R, where T is the
ﬁxed planning horizon. Two things are worth noting. First, their linear transformation does
not solve the problem of non-convex indifference curves—see below. Second, in our model,
T is a stochastic variable and the expected planning horizon at birth is given by ∆(0,0), where
∆(u,λ) is deﬁned in (11) above. Transforming our model in terms of expected years of
retirement (from the perspective of birth), ∆(0,0) − R suffers from the same defects.
The basic point is that a linear transformation does not guarantee well-behaved indif-
ference curves. Linear transformations simply cannot solve convexity/concavity problems
because they are shape-preserving. This can easily be demonstrated in the context of our
model. The steady-state concentrated utility function is given by (25) in the text. We write it
as ¯ Λ(u,li,R) but hold u constant. To determine the slope and curvature of the indifference
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¯ ΛR ≷ 0. (A.5)
















Hence, the indifference curves are always upward sloping.
To compute the curvature of the indifference curve in (R,li)-space we must take into ac-
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 ≷ 0. (A.7)
Equation (A.7) is a rather intractable expression, and the sign is ambiguous in general. How-
ever, numerical simulations reveal that for realistic parameter values the indifference curves
are either concave in R or S-shaped (i.e., convex for small R and concave for large R). Similar
results can be derived for the speciﬁcation used by Burbidge and Robb (1980, p. 425), so their
assumption that the indifference curves are convex in the relevant region is problematic.
The key point to note is that a linear transformation of the retirement age is unhelpful.
Hence, transforming our model in terms of expected years of retirement, ∆(0,0) − R, is not
useful either.
Appendix B
The comparative static effect of increased longevity on retirement–stated in (36) in the text–is
computed as follows. First, we combine equations (29) and (31), set u = ¯ a(u) = 0, and write
the ﬁrst-order condition for the optimal transformed retirement age, R∗, as:






where the second-order condition for utility maximization implies that ∂Γ/∂R∗ < 0, and




¯ w(s)e−[rs+M(s,ψm)]ds − ¯ z∆(0,r,ψm). (A.9)
In equation (A.9), lifetime income depends on the mortality parameter ψm because both
wage income and poll taxes are annuitized using the actuarially fair annuity rate of interest,
r + m(s,ψm). In addition, in equation (A.8) the mortality parameter affects the marginal

















σ|∂Γ/∂R∗| is a positive constant.
41Appendix C
In Section 4 of the paper we use data on replacement rates and implicit tax rates that were
gathered from the various chapters in Gruber and Wise (1999). For convenience we present
an overview of these data here. The ﬁgures refer to data taken from Tables 1.4, 2.2, 3.5, 5.4,
6.1, 7.1, 8.7, 9.2, 10.4, and 11.1. Note that we report the retirement age in the ﬁrst column
of Tables A1. and A.2. In contrast, Gruber and Wise (1999) report the last age of active
employment. Our entries for age 60 are thus equivalent to their entries for age 59.





59 0.749 0.182 0.920 0.798 0.552 0.910 0.590
60 0.771 0.202 0.910 0.799 0.800 0.906 0.661
61 0.794 0.217 0.920 0.804 0.799 0.900 0.730 0.403
62 0.817 0.245 0.910 0.805 0.802 0.902 0.816 0.440
63 0.839 0.270 0.920 0.805 0.801 0.892 0.895 0.476
64 0.863 0.508 0.920 0.809 0.438 0.909 0.996 0.703
65 0.874 0.518 0.930 0.809 0.549 0.909 0.998 0.464 0.749
66 0.882 0.527 0.940 0.809 0.547 0.909 0.996 0.491 0.798
67 0.890 0.850 0.950 0.809 0.716 0.909 0.988 0.519 0.845
68 0.898 0.881 0.960 0.809 0.608 0.909 0.981 0.549 0.872
69 0.905 0.914 0.960 0.809 0.607 0.909 0.973 0.581 0.898
Source: Gruber and Wise (1999)
Table A.1: Replacement Rates in Nine OECD Countries
42Age Belgium Canada France Italy Japan Neth’s Spain UK US
55 -0.129 -0.049 -0.910 0.245 -0.195 0.687 0.216 0.020 -0.022
56 -0.134 0.003 -0.970 0.308 -0.202 0.650 0.108 0.010 0.046
57 -0.145 0.037 -0.460 0.338 -0.106 0.612 0.153 0.030 0.060
58 -0.148 0.038 0.040 0.372 -0.112 0.578 0.362 0.030 0.069
59 -0.157 0.040 0.050 0.401 -0.138 -3.777 0.286 0.030 0.072
60 0.496 0.063 0.670 0.697 0.338 1.410 -0.149 0.030 0.071
61 0.497 0.066 0.600 0.711 0.340 1.384 -0.120 0.020 0.064
62 0.491 0.064 0.630 0.718 0.342 1.339 -0.112 0.020 -0.028
63 0.489 0.071 0.560 0.729 0.340 1.280 0.046 0.020 -0.005
64 0.473 0.169 0.560 0.746 0.204 1.222 0.160 0.020 0.031
65 0.529 0.285 0.520 0.756 0.000 0.357 0.757 0.010 0.188
66 0.519 0.323 0.480 0.772 0.000 0.347 0.767 0.020 0.225
67 0.476 0.259 0.460 0.787 0.000 0.337 0.777 0.030 0.269
68 0.463 0.203 0.450 0.803 0.000 0.327 0.741 0.050 0.439
69 0.440 0.229 0.430 0.818 0.000 0.315 0.705 0.070 0.455
Source: Gruber and Wise (1999)
Table A.2: Implicit Tax Rates in Nine OECD Countries
Appendix D
In this appendix we derive the comparative static effects reported in Table 1 in the text. By
combining equations (29) and the lower branch in (39), and setting u = ¯ a(u) = 0, we obtain
the ﬁrst-order condition which implicitly deﬁnes a unique solution for R∗:












¯ w(s)e−[rs+M(s)]ds − ¯ z∆(0,r,ψm) + SSW (0,R∗). (A.12)
The second-order condition of utility maximization implies that −ζ0 ≡ ∂Γ/∂R∗ < 0, and we















rule, i.e. dR∗/d¯ z = (1/ζ0)∂Γ/∂¯ z, dR∗/dtL = (1/ζ0)∂Γ/∂tL, dR∗/dB(R) = (1/ζ0)∂Γ/∂B(R),
and dR∗/dB0 (R) = (1/ζ0)∂Γ/∂B0 (R).
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